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R e m o v a l  o f  t h e  d i r e c t enforceability of the European Convention on Human Rights in UK law (which would be 
the effect of the repeal of the Human 
Rights Act) would be a further - and 
unnecessarily gratuitous - act of self-
harming isolationism by the UK. 
It would be seen as a deliberately 
hostile intervention by a Scotland that 
already finds itself being taken out 
of the EU against its will and whose 
devolution settlement has the European 
Convention as a central hinge. Repeal 
would destabilise the Good Friday 
Agreement and fur ther damage 
relations with the Republic of Ireland, 
already under strain because of BREXIT. 
The British Bill of Rights, with which it is 
proposed to replace the Human Rights 
Act, is presently without substance 
and, despite Government promises of 
consultation, threatens to be merely a 
‘top-down’ Westminster manoeuvre to 
camouflage the assault on rights that 
repeal of the Human Rights Act would 
inevitably entail.
The Political Context
The Human Rights Act has never been 
supported by government, even by the 
Blair administration which secured its 
enactment. The media have also hated 
it from the start, blaming it for the 
development of a law of privacy that 
hits profits. Then in the mid-2000s 
just as the Europhobia that was to 
lead to BREXIT was coming into the 
mainstream from the political fringe, 
along came the axe-killer John Hirst, 
winning a case in the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg on the 
right of (some) prisoners to vote. Now, 
Strasbourg is not Brussels, and the 
European Convention has nothing to 
do with the EU, but it is (continental) 
Europe. Eurosceptics seized on the Hirst 
case and quickly made the leap from it 
to clamouring for the repeal of the UK’s 
Human Rights Act – a measure which 
had nothing to do with prisoners’ 
voting but which does include the 
rights in the European Convention 
within its protective remit. After the 
Conservative Party’s surprise victory in 
2015 the country found itself victim not 
only of the BREXIT referendum but also 
of a manifesto promise to repeal the 
Human Rights Act. 
Theresa May as Home Secretary has 
long disliked the Act and has over the 
years been a leader of the charge for 
its removal, even suggesting (during 
the BREXIT campaign) departure from 
the whole Convention system itself. 
That dramatic inwards turn – no fewer 
than 47 states, from Russia to Turkey 
are members – has been ruled out 
(at least for now). The Human Rights 
Act continues to teeter on the brink, 
with the new Justice Secretary Liz 
Truss re-committing to its repeal on 
22 August. The measure has been the 
innocent victim of a cross-fire battle 
in the Conservative party between 
the Europeanists and the Eurosceptics 
– hatred of the Act was a proxy for 
hatred of the European Convention 
which was in turn a proxy for the real 
enemy, the European Union. Now the 
Brussels monster has been slain, even 
extreme Europhobes must wonder why 
they should any longer bother with the 
smaller fry caught on No-Man’s Land. 
It is a meaningless preoccupation for 
a government and parliament with far 
bigger self-inflicted worries on its plate.
The Case For Repeal Is Not 
Made Out
It might be worth persevering with 
change if the arguments for repeal 
had any independent substance to 
them. In fact they are rooted in a 
series of false assumptions about the 
Act, myths that need to be believed 
if the argument against the Act is to 
have any coherence. Here are some 
basic but frequently ignored truths.
The Human Rights Act 
respects parliamentary 
sovereignty
This is made clear in section 3(2) and 
again in sections 4 and 6. Our elected 
representat ives can do whatever 
rights-violating that they judge to 
be necessary. Public authorities must 
execute such wishes, being specifically 
protected from being successfully sued 
under the Human Rights Act whenever 
they can point to a clear mandate 
from Parliament to do what they are 
doing. So the judges simply cannot 
override the rights-violating wishes 
of Parliament where these are stated 
in terms that make this consequence 
unavoidable. It is true that the Act 
allows judges to be somewhat creative 
in their interpretation of laws so as to 
ensure the actions under them do not 
breach the rights set out in the Act, but 
it specifically prohibits them from going 
beyond the bounds of the ‘possible’ in 
trying to achieve this (section 3(1)). The 
judges have followed this instruction 
to the letter. Even if they didn’t the 
legislature could override them if it so 
wished. 
The drafters of the Human Rights Act 
protected parliamentary sovereignty 
because the Labour government 
behind the measure insisted on it. 
As a consolation to rights-supporters 
more fervent than themselves, the 
law also included a special pseudo-
remedy where parliament has acted 
in a direct, rights-infringing way, ‘the 
declaration of incompatibility’ (section 
4). This allows our top courts to declare 
a law ‘incompatible’ with the rights in 
the Human Rights Act but specifically 
states that such ‘declarations’ are to 
carry no legal impact whatsoever. The 
government has to revisit the issue 
after such rulings and consider what, if 
anything, to do – but it remains master 
of the process, the courts (and human 
rights) remaining well below in the 
pecking order of power.
Breaching human r ights remains 
something of which politicians are 
not proud, so those declarations that 
the courts have made have generally 
been followed up by the government. 
So with the famous Belmarsh case, 
where our most senior judges declared 
the detention without charge of 
suspected international terrorists to 
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be a breach of rights, the government 
did change things, introducing control 
orders instead. When Mr Cameron 
and Mrs May decided to implement 
a ruling on fairness for people on the 
sex offenders’ register – an emotive 
topic – they asserted that they were 
compelled by the courts to do what 
they were doing. But they weren’t, just 
as Mr Blair’s government could have 
stuck by Belmarsh, they could simply 
have said that they were intent upon 
doing nothing. 
It is true that the Strasbourg court 
remains in its oversight position over 
all UK law while the UK remains a 
member of the Council of Europe – 
and there are no plans presently to 
withdraw (whatever the current Prime 
Minister might have said in the course 
of the BREXIT campaign). This inevitably 
means that if the government violates 
human rights at home it may well end 
up failing to defend itself successfully 
in Strasbourg. But this has nothing 
to do with the Human Rights Act. It 
is not to be blamed for events that 
occur elsewhere for which it has no 
responsibility.
The European Court of 
Human Rights does not rule 
over the UK courts
A further word on the Strasbourg 
court is called for. Just as parliament 
wrestled with sovereignty and rights 
when enacting the Human Rights Act 
in the late 1990s, so too did it have 
to work out what to say about the 
rulings of this body. Strasbourg was 
(still is) the final court of interpretation 
on what the Convention meant. On 
the other hand there was no stomach 
for making this European institution 
the top court in the UK. The answer 
(in section 2) was to make sure the 
British courts knew about the relevant 
Strasbourg case-law whilst also making 
clear they did not have to ‘follow’ it 
in the slavish way lower courts do to 
decisions in the British system further 
up the pecking order (the doctrine of 
precedent). After a false start – when 
the judges here were a bit too over-
enthusiastic in following Strasbourg – 
the position is now clear that section 
2 means what it says: that the judges 
can depart from Strasbourg where 
they feel strongly that that court has 
got it wrong, in for example the laws 
of evidence in serious criminal trials 
(R v Horncastle) and the rules on life 
imprisonment (R v McLoughlin and 
Newell). The cases where this has 
happened make clear that this is the 
privilege of only very senior judges. 
Strasbourg can then ref lect  and 
comment on the UK approach when 
a suitable case comes along before 
them (and have done so from time 
to time). It is much more ‘dialogue’ 
than dominat ion. Sure,  ignor ing 
Strasbourg might create the problems 
of non-compliance just referred to 
with regard to acts of parliament – but 
that risk is entailed in membership of 
the Council of Europe, not something 
the Human Rights Act has caused. 
The Human Rights Act 
protects us all
 The Act is the reason why we all have 
some protection now from the intrusion 
of the media into our private lives but 
it goes well beyond that. If we are in 
a care home, it is because of the Act 
that we have a better chance of being 
treated with dignity and respect. 
It is because of the Act that public 
authorities need now to be more careful 
how they respond to plausible death 
threats by strangers against those they 
stalk, and why housing authorities need 
to be more open to discussion before 
they make eviction decisions. If we join 
the armed forces, it is because of the 
fear of accountability under the Human 
Rights Act that army chiefs need to 
be careful before they send us to our 
deaths in undefended transport vehicles 
at war or into murderously savage 
training routines at peace. If those 
whom we care about die in unexpected 
ways the Human Rights Act gives us a 
fighting chance of finding out what 
really happened, as in Hillsborough or 
domestic violence or in cases of failure 
of child protection. The Human Rights 
Act has also insisted on protections for 
prisoners, suspected terrorists, asylum 
seekers and others who are traditionally 
unable to rely on the law for support. 
For many, this is reason enough to 
argue for its retention. But the Act goes 
much further than that too, reaching 
everyone. We are all only one unlucky 
or ill-judged step away from needing 
the Act. 
Fragmenting The United 
Kingdom
The Labour government that enacted 
the Human Rights Act embedded it 
in the devolution arrangements that 
were achieved in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland in the same year 
as the measure’s enactment. Each 
model is different but they share a 
commitment to human rights as a 
central theme. Of the three, only Wales 
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voted BREXIT with England – the other 
two were unequivocal remainers. For 
Westminster now to impose repeal of 
the Act would be like throwing further 
petrol on the raging fire of alienation 
that BREXIT has already started. A 
conversation about reopening the Irish 
unity issue has already begun in Ireland. 
If the Human Rights Act were now 
to be undone, might space be being 
unwittingly created for further reneging 
on past promises by darker forces? 
The Bill Of Rights Alternative
The so-called British bill of rights is 
merely a camouflage with which to 
disguise the sharp reduction in rights 
protection that repeal of the Human 
Rights Act would necessarily entail. 
The headline claims will no doubt be 
loud, but the small print devastating 
for the principles of universality, justice 
and fairness that are what the Human 
Rights Act is all about. The idea of 
a British bill of rights imposed by 
Parliament on the whole kingdom is 
of a piece with the fantasy that drove 
BREXIT - a lost vision of a homogenous, 
Westminster-led land in which everyone 
knew their place. We should celebrate 
the departure of this vision not legislate 
to fool ourselves into believing it 
continues.
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